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THE SIMPLICITY OF ANTITRUST LAW
Richard M. Steuer*
Antitrust law has grown increasingly complex, leading some to the
misperception that it is often irrational and varies widely from one country
to the next. In fact, antitrust is simpler than it seems. Properly applied,
antitrust law focuses simply, and entirely, on combating two of the most
innate proclivities in human nature—bullying and ganging up—when such
conduct harms competition. Once this is understood, the concerns
expressed about irrationality and disharmony begin to disappear.
If it is true that all we really need to know we learned in kindergarten,1
then all we really need to know about antitrust law we learned there too.
I.

IT’S SIMPLER THAN ONE MIGHT THINK

On the surface, antitrust seems more complex than this. Since the
seminal case of Mitchel v. Reynolds2 was decided in 1711 and the Sherman
Act3 was passed in 1890, antitrust terminology has grown increasingly
complicated. Today, there is a profusion of jargon for antitrust offenses,
from abuse of dominance4 and bundling5 to technological tying6 and
unilateral effects,7 plus a host of acronyms and abbreviations such as
SSNIPs,8 HHIs,9 and UPP.10 Economics, including econometrics and
* Member of the New York Bar. The author gratefully acknowledges the
encouragement and valuable comments of Jonathan B. Baker and Edward D. Cavanagh, and
the able assistance of Jarman D. Russell.
1. ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED IN KINDERGARTEN
(1988).
2. (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.); 1 P.Wms. 181.
3. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006)).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art.
102, Sep. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
5. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007).
6. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1983).
7. U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Federal Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 6
(2010) [hereinafter DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
8. Id. § 4.1.2.
9. Id. § 5.3.
10. Id. § 6.1; Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog
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behavioral economics, has provided greater insight, but added to the
terminological clutter.11
Yet all the years of litigation and study reveal that there really are only
two offenses against competition: single-actor bullying and multi-actor
ganging up. The rest, except for some outlier offenses,12 are simply
variations on these two (with merger enforcement meant to guard against
both).13
Within the antitrust community, anticompetitive unilateral bullying is
labeled monopolization, attempted monopolization, unfair practices, or
abuse of dominance. Anticompetitive ganging up is termed combination,
conspiracy, cartelization, or boycott, depending on the context. The
Sherman Act rests on these two core pillars, as does the competition
legislation of the European Union and most other jurisdictions.
This categorization does not mean that all initiatives by powerful
firms and all collective activities by competitors are anticompetitive.
Monopolists are expected to continue innovating and competing, while
competitors are encouraged to create efficiencies necessitating
collaboration. Nor does this categorization mean that it is always easy to
distinguish what is anticompetitive from what is competitively neutral or
even procompetitive. It simply means that all activities harming the
economy by undermining the competitive process fit within the category of
either bullying or ganging up.
Once this principle is appreciated, it becomes easier to recognize that
all competition law, if properly applied, should be directed against, and
only against, assaults on competition from bullying and ganging up. It also
becomes easier to recognize that there already has been substantial
convergence toward this understanding, both within the United States and
around the world.
Moreover, it becomes easier to explain to skeptics why competition
law exists and why, notwithstanding the cost of compliance and
enforcement, the economy is better off having it.

to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST 701, 726 (2010).
11. See, e.g., Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) 1, 2 (1993),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf; Elizabeth M. Bailey, Behavioral
Economics: Implications for Antitrust Practitioners, (ABA/The Antitrust Source, Chicago,
Ill.), June 2010, at 1.
12. See infra note 26.
13. Antitrust offenses also may be classified by the type of harm they inflict, such as
foreclosure of competitors or artificial elevation of prices to customers, rather than by the
nature of the behavior involved.
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CONDEMNATION IS TIMELESS

While bullying and ganging up may be innate, condemnation of these
offenses has an impressively long history itself. Unilateral economic
bullying traces back at least to stratagems employed to outmaneuver rivals
in ancient Egypt and Rome, at medieval fairs and markets,14 and to crown
monopolies that were empowered to exclude competitors.15 Disapproval of
such practices can be traced to early religious and judicial codes.16 Under
English common law, this disapproval evolved into the economic torts of
forestalling, engrossing, and regrating.17
Economic ganging up traces back to collusion among tradesmen in
isolated hamlets18 and members of the guilds of European cities.19
Disapproval of such activity, like disapproval of single-firm
anticompetitive activity, also finds its origins in religion and early judicial
codes.20 In England, this evolved into the common law against contracts in
restraint of trade and the common law and legislation against combinations
in restraint of trade.21
The common thread was that the sovereign could establish a
monopoly or authorize collective anticompetitive action, but without
official approval, monopolization and cartelization faced censure.
Over time, these core principles evolved into the law that served as the
basis for today’s legislation. The Industrial Revolution transformed
manufacturing, distribution, marketing, and retailing, but the law dictating
the rules by which firms compete can still trace a direct lineage to the
earliest limitations on single firm conduct and collusion.

14. LORD WILBERFORCE, ALAN CAMPBELL & NEIL ELLES, THE LAW OF RESTRICTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES 2–3, 20–21 (2d ed. 1996); William L. Letwin, The
English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 355, 368 (1954).
15. Letwin, supra note 14, at 356–67.
16. See WILBERFORCE, ET AL., supra note 14, at 2–3; Jacob Rosenberg and Avi Weiss,
Land Concentration, Efficiency, Slavery, and the Jubilee, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JUDAISM AND ECONOMICS, 74, 76–77 (Aaron Levine ed., 2010).
17. Letwin, supra note 14, at 368.
18. Id. at 364.
19. WILBERFORCE, ET AL., supra note 14, at 27–28.
20. Id. at 2–3, 22; Dani Rapp, The Employee Free Choice Act, Unions, and Unionizing
in Jewish Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JUDAISM AND ECONOMICS 429, 441 (Aaron
Levine ed., 2010).
21. Letwin, supra note 14, at 373–85; see also MILTON HANDLER ET AL., TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 103–49 (4th ed. 1960).
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III. CURRENT ANTITRUST LAW IS LARGELY CONFINED TO BULLYING
AND GANGING UP—AND SHOULD BE
Today’s competition laws, guidelines, and commentary are rich with
contemporary interpretations and illustrations, but all build upon the same
foundation, condemning anticompetitive bullying and ganging up. In the
Sherman Act, notable for its simplicity, Section 1 reaches agreements in
unreasonable restraint of competition and Section 2 reaches
monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to
monopolize.22 Similarly, Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union prohibits agreements that restrict competition, subject
to various exceptions, and Article 102 prohibits abuse of a dominant
position.23 In China, the Anti-Monopoly Law likewise includes a series of
articles on anticompetitive agreements and another series of articles on
abuse of dominance.24 Other nations’ laws follow the same pattern.25
Consistent with this legislation, antitrust offenses, for all their variety,
almost invariably are based on proof of anticompetitive bullying or ganging
up.26 For example, offenses based on horizontal agreements, such as price
fixing, output restriction, market division, and boycotts, all involve
anticompetitive ganging up.27 Competitors conspire against customers to

22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). Mergers, once reached exclusively under the Sherman
Act, also can be reached under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006), which
includes an incipiency standard to reach threatened monopolization.
23. TFEU, supra note 4, arts. 101–02.
24. Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), chs. II–III.
25. Prominent examples include Japan, Canada, and Brazil. See Shiteki-dokusen no
Kinshi oyobi Kōseitorhiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Act on Prohibition of Private
Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Act No. 54 of 1947, ch. III, V;
Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, pt. VIII (Can.); Decreto No. 8.884, de 11 de Junho
de 1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 13.06.1994 (Braz.). See generally ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES (2001).
26. There are certain outlier offenses that have been codified as part of the antitrust
laws but are designed to achieve other goals, such as sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the RobinsonPatman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(d)–13(e) (2006), which create per se offenses for
discrimination in providing promotional services and facilities regardless of the effect on
competition. Also, as pointed out infra, there have been occasional misguided decisions
finding antitrust offenses in the absence of any genuine bullying or ganging up, based
largely on misapprehension of the objectives of competition law.
27. See, e.g., Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (anticompetitive
market division); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)
(prohibition on competitive bidding); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 395 U.S.
100 (1969) (conspiracy to exclude from foreign markets); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (retailer-initiated boycott of competing retailers by
manufacturers and distributors); Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951) (price fixing as well as restriction of exports and imports).
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charge them higher prices or to limit their choices.28 Customers conspire
against sellers to drive down the prices of what they buy. 29 In contrast,
legitimate joint ventures and ancillary restraints represent examples of
competitors collaborating to create something new without colluding to
impede competition that otherwise would exist.30
Offenses based on vertical resale agreements such as resale price
maintenance involve either unilateral or collective conduct. As the
Supreme Court recently explained in the Leegin case,31 vertical restraints
can be unreasonable when they are abused by a powerful buyer or seller, or
where they are likely to facilitate conspiracy among either manufacturers or
distributors to limit competition.32 Vertical restraints are unlikely to offend
the antitrust laws when there is no market power being exerted and the
restraint was initiated unilaterally by the seller.33
Offenses based on vertical purchase requirements, such as exclusive
dealing and tying, require proof of the foreclosure of competition by a firm
possessing sufficient market power to become a bully.34 Monopolization
28. See, e.g., Palmer, 498 U.S. at 49 (noting that horizontal territorial agreements are
“formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising” prices); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs,
435 U.S. at 695 (holding that prohibitions on competitive bidding “prevents all customers
from making price comparisons”).
29. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235
(1948) (recognizing the applicability of the antitrust laws to buyer agreements to eliminate
competition among themselves); United States v. Seville Indus. Mach. Corp., 696 F. Supp.
986 (D.N.J. 1988) (same).
30. See, e.g., Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006) (joint venture agreement was
not an anticompetitive horizontal price-fixing agreement); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23–25 (1979) (holding that blanket licenses granted by
clearinghouses did not constitute a type of price fixing); cf. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l
Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010) (deeming the League subject to antitrust
scrutiny while also noting that its constituent competitors “share an interest in making the
entire league successful and profitable”) (reasonableness to be determined on remand).
31. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
32. Id. at 892–94.
33. Nine West Grp. Inc., Docket No. C-3937, 2008 WL 2061410 (F.T.C. May 6, 2008)
(modifying a 2000 consent decree to permit respondent to enter into minimum resale price
maintenance agreements, under reporting obligations, where restraint was instigated by the
manufacturer, not the dealers, and the manufacturer lacked market power). However, the
rule of per se illegality against minimum resale price maintenance remains under the laws of
certain states. See, e.g., California v. DermaQuest, Inc., 2010-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 76,922
(Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2010) (the State of California brought a case against DermaQuest,
a maker of skin care products, under California’s antitrust law on a per se theory and the
case was ultimately settled); Verified Petition, People v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., No.
400837/10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 29, 2010) (the State of New York brought a case on a per se
theory against mattress manufacturer Tempur-Pedic under New York law).
34. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992)
(“The existence of [monopolistic] power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession
of a predominant share of the market.”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 13–16 (1984) (requiring proof that an illegal exercise of market power “force a
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offenses, such as predatory pricing and other forms of predation, require
proof of anticompetitive activity by a firm with the power to control prices
or exclude competitors, or the strong likelihood of achieving that power.35
All of these essentially are instances of single firm misconduct,
notwithstanding the fact that the imposition of vertical agreements may
play a role.36
Merger offenses require proof that the merger threatens to create or
enhance the power to bully or collude and harm competition. In the case of
horizontal mergers, the offense requires proof that the merged firm will be
able to exercise market power over customers or suppliers, usually by
changing prices, or that the merger will facilitate collusion among the
merged firm and its remaining competitors.37 In the case of vertical
mergers, the offense requires proof that the merged firm will be able to
impede competitors at one or both levels, usually by foreclosing them from
needed inputs or outlets.38
This focus on anticompetitive bullying and ganging up is as it should
be, because when courts, enforcers and policymakers extend antitrust law
further, trouble follows. For example, there has been sharp criticism of the
over-deterrence of joint ventures,39 challenges to horizontal agreements
purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market”).
35. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222 (1993) (holding that under both the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman Act a claimant
must show that a competitor has “priced its products in an unfair manner with an object to
eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain and exercise control over prices in the
relevant market”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985) (noting that proof that a firm has been “attempting to exclude rivals on some basis
other than efficiency . . . characterize[s] its behavior as predatory”).
36. See supra note 34 (citing cases demonstrating instances of single firm misconduct,
including vertical restraints).
37. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 7, §§ 6, 7, 12.
38. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1984); Richard M.
Steuer, Foreclosure, in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 925–37 (2008).
39. These concerns prompted enactment of the National Cooperative Research Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–05 (2006)).
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1044 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3131, 3133 (describing
“widespread concern among members of both houses that . . . firms may be foregoing lawful
ventures under the misperception that the antitrust laws preclude such conduct”). In 1988,
Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity commented that any attempt to create a
production joint venture in the United States “virtually invites an antitrust lawsuit . . .
produc[ing] a chilling effect in the U.S. on some kinds of technology development.” C.
William Verity, Grant Antitrust Exemptions . . . to Spur Cooperative Ventures, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 27, 1988, at A10. Representative Rick Boucher of Virginia warned Congress that
“[t]he threat of treble damages and attorney’s fees broadly inhibits the kinds of cooperative
arrangements in the United States that flourish in Japan and Europe.” 135 CONG. REC. E42502 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1989). In 1993, Congress passed the National Cooperative Research
and Production Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 4301–05 (2006)).
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enabling small competitors to compete against larger competitors,40 rules of
per se illegality for a host of distribution restraints,41 including maximum
resale price maintenance42 and certain forms of tying,43 proposals for “nofault” monopolization laws,44 challenges to mergers resulting in tiny shares
of any relevant market,45 application of the Robinson-Patman Act without
regard to effects on competition,46 the “nine no-no’s” prohibiting most
restrictions in patent licenses,47 and the presumption of market power in all
40. In re Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 102 F.T.C. 1307, 1314 (1983) (Commissioners
Miller and Douglas dissenting from application of per se rule to restraints initiated by
distributors of same brand); cf. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Response to Linen
Systems for Healthcare, LLC’s Request for Business Review Letter (Aug. 8, 2006)
(approving of proposed joint venture of regional textile maintenance companies to market
textile rental and laundry services to specialized health care client); U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Antitrust Div., Response to Container America, LLC’s Request for Business Review Letter
(Mar. 8, 2000), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/4287.htm (approving of
proposed creation and operation of joint selling and purchasing vehicle for five regional
manufacturers of steel drums).
41. Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57–58 (1977) (criticizing the
per se rule and instead applying the rule of reason to vertical distribution restraint).
42. Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1363 (7th Cir. 1996) (questioning the
continued application of the per se rule to maximum resale price maintenance, but applying
the standard), rev’d, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overturning the per se rule against maximum price
fixing). See also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 134
n.753 (6th ed. 2007) (collecting cases criticizing per se illegality applied to maximum resale
price fixing).
43. Compare Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (“it is
unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market”), with Eastman
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 502–04 (1992) (applying rule of reason
to conclude that replacement parts were a separate market than manufactured machines and
hold that defendant may be unlawfully tying the two dependent upon market power), and
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31–32 (1984) (applying rule of
reason analysis to conclude that a large hospital was not unlawfully tying surgical services
to services of anesthesiology firm).
44. Milton Handler & Richard M. Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault
Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 182–90 (1980).
45. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301–02 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (discussing mergers and commenting that “the sole consistency that I can find is
that in litigation under [Section] 7, the Government always wins”).
46. Volvo Trucks N. Am. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 180–81 (2006)
(holding that the Robinson-Patman Act does not signal a departure from the principle that
interbrand competition is the primary concern of antitrust law).
47. Compare Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Patent and Know-How
License Agreements: Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions (Nov. 6,
1970) (describing the patent licensing practices covered by the Nine No-Nos and considered
to be per se illegal without regard to economic effect), with Charles F. Rule, Assistant Att’y
Gen., The Antitrust Implications of Patent Licensing: After the Nine No-Nos (Oct. 21,
1986), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,131 (supporting the adoption of a rule of reason
approach because the practices covered by the “no-no’s” are frequently procompetive). See
also Abbott B. Lipsky, Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent Licensing Practices,
Remarks Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section (Nov. 5, 1981) (further
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patents.48 These are only some of the best-known instances of the antitrust
laws being applied to condemn practices that did not genuinely embody
unilateral or collective conduct posing a serious threat to competition.
In fact, upon analysis, it turns out that most of the criticism heaped on
antitrust enforcement over the years has been directed at instances in which
decision-makers lost sight of targeting anticompetitive bullying and
ganging up. If neither exists or is seriously threatened, decision-makers
need to ask themselves what exactly they are trying to prevent. The answer
may lead to the conclusion that there is no violation at all, or that if there is
a violation, it is of another law directed at something other than
safeguarding competition.
A number of courts have faced reversal over the years for trying to
apply antitrust liability to activity that might offend other laws but does not
threaten competition. Some courts neglect to find a threat to competition
before looking for bullying misbehavior. For example, in Spectrum Sports,
Inc. v. McQuillan,49 the lower court was reversed for treating unfair or
predatory conduct as attempted monopolization without evidence of a
dangerous probability that monopoly power actually would be achieved.
The Supreme Court rejected the “notion that proof of unfair or predatory
conduct alone is sufficient” to establish a great enough threat to
competition to constitute an antitrust violation.50 Some courts neglect to
find an effect on competition when examining ganging up. In NYNEX
Corp. v. Discon, Inc.,51 the lower court was reversed for treating an alleged
conspiracy to commit regulatory fraud as an antitrust violation where there
was no harm to the competitive process. The Supreme Court explained that
the approach taken by the lower court “would transform cases involving
business behavior that is improper for various reasons, say, cases involving
nepotism or personal pique,” into antitrust cases.52 Other examples are
legion.53
supporting the application of a rule of reason to the “nine no-no’s”).
48. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46 (2006) (holding that the
mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support a presumption of market power).
49. 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
50. Id. at 457. The Court added, “[t]he purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect
businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the
market.” Id. at 458.
51. 525 U.S. 128 (1998).
52. Id. at 137.
53. E.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. F.T.C., 729 F.2d 128, 141–42 (2d Cir. 1984)
(vacating F.T.C. order prohibiting advance price announcements and most favored nations
clauses, which had condemned consciously parallel pricing in the absence of collusion);
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. F.T.C., 630 F.2d 920, 925–28 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing
F.T.C. order against monopolist publisher’s refusal to publish connecting flight schedules,
which did not enhance the publisher’s monopoly); E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Belle, Inc.,
525 F.2d 296, 306 (10th Cir. 1975) (reversing judgment for plaintiff on claim of attempted
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Recognizing that competition law is directed against anticompetitive
single-firm bullying and collusive ganging up is important, but only the
first step to antitrust analysis. Even more important is appreciating that,
properly interpreted, competition law should not be directed against
anything else, and that, to the extent it is applied more expansively, it is
likely to reach haphazard and unfortunate results. The key to public
confidence in competition law is to remain faithful to this focus.
Acknowledging the limits of competition law is essential to preserving it.
IV. GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW HAS LARGELY CONVERGED
Convergence has been the Holy Grail of competition law for thirty
years. Today, there are nearly 170 jurisdictions with competition laws
around the world,54 and over fifty more in the United States alone. While
convergence long seemed out of reach, despite the efforts of academic
pioneers and such bodies as the International Competition Network and the
World Trade Organization,55 the reality is that there is more convergence
today than seemed possible not long ago. Virtually every competition
regime limits anticompetitive bullying and ganging up, and while the
language and procedures vary enormously, the direction is largely the
same.
Different competition laws look very dissimilar on the surface, with a
variety of thresholds, safe harbors, exemptions, enforcement mechanisms,
and special industry rules, plus a different glossary of terms for each
regime. For example, the antitrust statutes of the United States generally
are less detailed than the EU competition statutes. Safe harbors in the
United States derive from case law and are reflected in enforcement
guidelines while in other jurisdictions they are written into the statutes
themselves or delineated in block exemptions.56 Yet underneath, the
monopolization in the absence of market data).
54. There are approximately 169 countries with some form of competition law in place.
See
INTERNATIONAL
BAR
ASSOCIATION’S
GLOBAL
COMPETITION
FORUM,
http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org (last visited Sept. 12, 2011) (noting anticompetition laws of countries around the world under the heading of “laws”). See generally
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES (2001)
(discussing competition law outside of the United States).
55. See Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust And Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT’L L.
1, 1–2 (1997) (advocating an international system of competition law); Eleanor M. Fox,
International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911, 913–15 (2003)
(describing competing strategies to remedy antitrust problems at an international level); ICN
Factsheet and Key Messages, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK 1, 2 (April 2009),
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf (stating that
“[b]y enhancing convergence and cooperation, the ICN promotes more efficient and
effective antitrust enforcement worldwide to the benefit of consumers and businesses”).
56. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 267/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 83) 1–7 (EU) (discussing
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principles on which these laws rest are largely the same.
This is all the more remarkable given the fact that some regimes are
based on judge-made common law rules while others are based on codes
and regulations. What is striking is not how different these structures are
but how similarly they apply legal and economic principles to comparable
facts and reach largely similar outcomes—not in every instance, but more
and more over time.57 Commentators never tire of isolating and dissecting
the actual or perceived dissonance among decisions in different
jurisdictions addressing the same or similar practices—and there have been
some whoppers58—but for all the historic and cultural differences among
legal systems, the core focus, and the outcomes, increasingly are the
same.59
the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to
certain categories of agreements, decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector
and requiring EU Regulation Commission to define the categories of insurance exemptions
to antitrust liability); McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (2006) (exempting
certain activity of insurers from antitrust liability).
57. For example, enforcers in the EU increasingly have employed an effects-based
analysis similar to that employed by enforcers in the U.S. See Massimo Motta et al.,
Hardcore Restrictions Under the Block Exemption Regulation on Vertical Agreements: An
economic view (2009), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/hardcore_restrictions_
under_BER.pdf (stating that “[t]he issuing of the BER, and of the Guidelines on Vertical
Restraints . . . which accompanied it, was rightly heralded as the introduction of an effectsbased approach into EC competition law on agreements”) (internal citation omitted); see
also Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the
EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45/7)
(advocating for an effects-based analysis).
58. See Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, 2001 E.C.R. II-48/1,
application for annulment denied; see also Case T–210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm’n, 2005
E.C.R. II–5575 and Case T–209/01, Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II–5532
(declaring a concentration to be incompatible with the common market and the EEA
Agreement), available at http://www.curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm; Eleanor M.
Fox, The European Court’s Judgment in GE/Honeywell—Not a Poster Child for Comity or
Convergence, ANTITRUST, Spring 2006, at 77 (noting the importance of GE/Honeywell as
the first “U.S.” merger cleared by the United States and prohibited by the European Union).
In years past, the difference between competition law in the EU and in other jurisdictions
used to be attributed more to the special priority afforded by the EU to combating barriers
between member states. See Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison,
in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 339, 340 (Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds.,
1997) (noting that the respective competition systems have developed out of different
concerns and exhibit significant variations).
59. Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and
In re Intel Corp., F.T.C. No. 9341, (Oct. 29, 2010) (withdrawn Nov. 2, 2010), and In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D 168, 169–70 (D.D.C. 2003) (case settled), and In re
Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig. MDL No. 1775, 2010 WL 1189341, at *3–4
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010), and In re Marine Hose Antitrust Litig., 531 F. Supp.2d 1381,
1381–82 (J.P.M.L. 2008), with Press Release, European Comm’n, Commission concludes
on Microsoft investigation, imposes conduct remedies and a fine (Mar. 24, 2004); and Press
Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission imposes fine of €1.06 bn on Intel for
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Of course, much of the convergence is attributable to the practice of
many jurisdictions to model their competition laws after those of another
jurisdiction with a longer history of enforcement. The EU model has been
copied repeatedly, while other regimes are modeled after the American
approach.60
It also has helped the process of convergence that even in common
law jurisdictions, guidelines and official commentaries have proliferated,
making the philosophy behind application of the laws more transparent and
easier to grasp.61 Further, it has helped that enforcement officials,
academics, and members of the bar from around the world have been
meeting, communicating, and collaborating for years.62 Information
sharing, technical assistance, and other collaboration among nations all
have facilitated and hastened convergence.
This is not to say that the decision-makers in all these jurisdictions
never go astray. However, as in the United States, the most troubling
departures abroad have been instances in which the analysis lost sight of
core goals and condemned practices for other reasons.63 To the extent that
decisions have been true to preventing and curtailing anticompetitive
bullying and ganging up, and nothing more, there has been greater

abuse of dominant position; orders Intel to cease illegal practices (May 13 2009); and Press
Release, European Comm’n, Commission imposes fines on vitamin cartels (Nov. 21, 2001);
and Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission fines 11 air cargo carriers
€799 million in price fixing cartel (Nov. 9, 2010); and Press Release, European Comm’n,
Antitrust: Commission fines marine hose producers € 131 million for market sharing and
price-fixing cartel (Jan. 28, 2009).
60. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES 13–14 (2001).
61. Different jurisdictions have issued guidelines on merger review, vertical restraints,
licensing, horizontal collaboration, and other topics. See, e.g., Alden F. Abbott and Samuel
N. Weinstein, The New U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines and International Competition
Policy Convergence, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 39 (explaining the role of the 2010 U.S.
merger guidelines in fostering international convergence).
62. See generally Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Transatlantic Antitrust: Past and Present, Remarks Prepared for St. Gallen International
Competition Law Forum (May 21, 2010) (recapping the achievements of transatlantic
antitrust over the past 20 years); Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence:
A Positive View, ANTITRUST, Summer 2005, at 25 (discussing the U.S.’s interest in
convergence and the international dialogue conducted toward that end).
63. For example, critics have sharply questioned the EU’s disapproval of the proposed
GE acquisition of Honeywell and the proposed Coca-Cola acquisition of Huiyuan Juice
Group, a Chinese juice maker, wondering whether political motives played a role. See, e.g.,
Fox, supra note 55, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. at 923 (noting the “perceived illegitimacy” of the
EU’s decision to enjoin the merger between GE and Honeywell); Hard to Swallow: China
Indicates the Real Targets of its Anti-monopoly Law: Outsiders, ECONOMIST, March 19,
2009, at 75 (suggesting that the Coca-Cola decision signals Chinese anti-monopoly law
really may be intended to create barriers for foreign companies).

STEUER_FINALIZED_FIVE (DO NOT DELETE)

554

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

2/21/2012 2:58 PM

[Vol. 14:2

convergence and less to criticize. Although there continue to be
differences, convergence has been growing stronger.
V.

THE ECONOMY IS MORE PRODUCTIVE WITH LIMITS ON
ANTICOMPETITIVE BULLYING AND GANGING UP

Naturally, convergence itself is not a desirable objective unless there
is convergence on a rule that benefits society. The law must prohibit
undesirable activity—here, anticompetitive activity—without prohibiting
desirable activity—here, efficient, pro-competitive or competitively neutral
conduct. Additionally, the law must be clear enough so that those
responsible for administering it are reliably able to distinguish what is
desirable and permissible from what is not.
In an environment in which some observers find contemporary
antitrust law both unfathomable and arbitrary, critics have called for
abridgment of antitrust enforcement or outright repeal of the antitrust
laws,64 allowing firms to compete as they wish. Antitrust enforcement has
been derided for stifling innovation and undermining competitiveness,65
raising questions about the very value of competition law. In the 1980s,
Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige remarked that the antitrust laws
“place additional and unnecessary burdens on the ability of U.S. firms to
compete.”66 Economist Lester Thurow advised that “America should
abolish its antitrust laws” because “[a]n economy where growth is stopped
64. E.g., Edwin S. Rockefeller, Letter to the Editor, Time for Antitrust to Bite the Dust,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2010, at A16 (“Antitrust . . . is unsound as law because it provides no
coherent set of ascertainable rules to guide conduct,” enabling government “to interfere
whimsically with freedom of contract, frequently on behalf of losers.”); EDWIN S.
ROCKEFELLER, THE ANTITRUST RELIGION (2007) (positing that antitrust is a religion and not
law because “enforcement is arbitrary, political regulation of commercial activity and not
enforcement of a coherent set of rules....”); D.T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY, THE CASE
FOR REPEAL x–xi (1986) (“[T]he case against antitrust is strong enough to justify the
complete repeal of all of the antitrust laws.”); See Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston,
Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence, J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, Fall 2003, at 3 (arguing that whether enforcement creates a social benefit has
not been established); Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73
ANTITRUST L. J. 483, 508 n.95, 514 n.114 (2006) (collecting additional sources); Jonathan B.
Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist
Challenged to Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 605, 640–41 n.156 (2010)
(collecting additional sources).
65. E.g., Rick Rule, The Case Against the Case Against Microsoft: Why the Justice
Department is Barking up the Wrong Operating System, SLATE MAGAZINE, Nov. 13, 1997
(questioning whether “we really want antitrust lawyers and economists determining Internet
standards”); Editorial, Target: Intel, and Competition: Team Obama Adopts the European
Model on Antitrust, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at A15 (criticizing the European approach
to antitrust as pro-competitor instead of pro-consumer).
66. Malcolm Baldrige, Op-Ed., Rx for Export Woes: Antitrust Relief, WALL ST. J., Oct.
15, 1985, at 28.
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and living standards are falling behind those of its competitors cannot
afford a legal system that cripples its industrial future.”67 Does monopoly
actually stifle innovation or does it encourage even greater innovation?
Does greater concentration really result in appreciably less competition? Is
the benefit of detecting and challenging monopolization and cartels worth
the cost? The empirical work on this issue is incomplete, though certainly
spirited.68
Unfortunately, the compendium of misguided antitrust decisions is
long enough to substantiate much of the criticism.69 When the Supreme
Court reverses its own rulings and Congress repeals its own laws—as has
happened more than once70—it becomes apparent that at least some
antitrust enforcement (take your pick as to which) has been
counterproductive. The issue, however, is not whether mistakes have been
made but whether the economy would be better served with laissez-faire
and self-correction or with limits on anticompetitive activity. The reversal
of prior rulings and the repeal of earlier laws do not mean that the economy
would be better off without any antitrust enforcement at all. The critics
may be correct with respect to instances of misguided or miscalibrated
enforcement, but not with respect to deterring the misuse of monopoly
power and conspiracies to raise prices or cut output. There is ample
evidence of the savings achieved by preventing and eliminating cartels.71
Agreements to raise prices or reduce output, except in the most unusual
circumstances, make markets less efficient and the economy worse off.72
The evidence is more mixed with regard to the benefits associated with
67. Lester C. Thurow, Op-Ed., Let’s Abolish the Antitrust Laws, N.Y. TIMES, October
19, 1980, at F2.
68. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON REMEDIES (2004); Crandall &
Winston, supra note 64.
69. See supra, notes 39–46.
70. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) (overturning the
per se rule in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 388 U.S. 365 (1967)); Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881–82 (2007) (overturning the
per se rule against manufacturers working with its distributors to set a minimum price for its
goods enunciated in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 220 U.S. 373 (1911));
Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (overturning the previously
established rule that “if the Government has granted the seller a patent or similar monopoly
over a product, it is fair to presume that the inability to buy the product elsewhere gives the
seller market power,” Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984));
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (repealing the Fair
Trade exemption established under Miller-Tydings Amendment (1937) and McGuire
Amendment (1952) to the F.T.C. Act).
71. Jonathan B. Baker, The Case for Antitrust Enforcement, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES,
Fall 2003, at 27 (2003); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise
Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513, 537–46 (2005).
72. Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile III, Antitrust in Wartime, ANTITRUST, Spring
2002, at 71–75 (explaining wartime exceptions).
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preventing and eliminating monopolization, but there is evidence of
benefits in many, if not all, instances.73 For example, there is ample
evidence that the acquisition, or maintenance of, monopoly power through
the use of dirty tricks or by raising rivals’ costs without creating any
efficiencies, makes markets less efficient and the overall economy worse
off.74 In contrast, there is little empirical evidence indicating that
economies are more productive where monopolization goes unchecked and
anticompetitive collusion is tolerated.75
The answer is not to eliminate antitrust law root and branch. Rather, it
is to confine antitrust law to addressing anticompetitive bullying and
ganging up, and to provide enough clarity to make the right outcomes
easier to perceive. The economy is better off with antitrust than without it,
as long as the limits are observed.
73. See Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain, supra note 64, at 616–20 (describing
both sides of the debate); Baker, supra note 71, at 33–35 (noting that prices fell for some
services offered by companies subject to antitrust litigation while acknowledging that there
were still impediments to competition). But see, Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 522 (1998) (noting
that network effects in various industries may create a variety of competition scenarios that
do not always require antitrust intervention).
74. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596–98 (1985);
Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs To Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L. J. 209, 214 (1986); Susan A. Creighton, D.
Bruce Hoffman, Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Ernest A. Nagata, Cheap Exclusion, 72
ANTITRUST L. J. 975, 983–87 (2005); cf. Tim Wu, In the Grip of the New Monopolists,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2010, at C3 (noting that monopolies developed by information
industries are often tolerated by government regulators despite frequently stifling innovation
in the long term).
75. Michael Porter concluded, after a four-year study of competitiveness, that “[i]n
global competition, successful firms compete vigorously at home and pressure each other to
improve and innovate.” MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS,
117 (1990). He found that when active rivalry is maintained in an industry, and when there
is an interchange of information among competitors about needs and technology, “the
conditions for competitive advantage are the most fertile.” Id. at 152. In contrast, he found
that “[o]ne of the most common, and often the most fatal, causes of lost national advantage
is the ebbing of domestic rivalry, since pressure to improve and adjust is often lost with it.”
Id. at 169. See also F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE, 438 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that high industrial concentration “is apt to retard
progress by restricting the number of independent sources of initiative and by dampening
firms’ incentive to gain market position through accelerated research and development.”);
WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX, 48–64 (1986) (discussing the
role of big corporations in technological innovation); Ken Ohmae, Japan vs. Japan: Only
the Strong Survive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 20 (“Japanese companies do not do so
well on world markets in industries . . . where one firm accounts for more than 50% of the
Japanese market.”); Baker, supra note 71; Willow A. Sheremata, Barriers to innovation: a
monopoly, network externalities, and the speed of innovation, 42 ANTITRUST BULLETIN937,
971–72 (Winter 1997) (stating that network externalities provide a monopolist with barriers
to entry, securing the monopolist’s position and reducing the incentives for all firms in the
industry to innovate).
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VI. SIMPLE RULES FACILITATE COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND
PUBLIC SUPPORT
Fortunately, the growing sophistication of antitrust analysis, both legal
and economic, has made decision-makers better equipped to reach the right
determinations—if they can maintain the right focus. The cause of rogue
decisions seldom has been defective rules or tools, but rather a
misunderstanding of the principles behind the rules. If judges, enforcement
officials, and lawyers confine their focus to unilateral and collective
activity that threatens serious harm to competition, the proper application
of the legal and economic principles and tools will become clearer. To a
large degree, the backlash against antitrust enforcement is in reaction to the
complexity, and resulting confusion, that has fostered bad policy decisions,
bad enforcement decisions, and bad judicial decisions. Once antitrust
becomes too complicated to explain on an elevator ride, it is in danger of
being misinterpreted by courts and losing widespread support.
How does one reconcile the benefits of greater sophistication against
the capacity to foster confusion and chaos? There is no need to rewrite the
laws, which are simple enough. There generally is no need to rewrite the
many guidelines either, although several might benefit from some
clarification. It would suffice for counselors, enforcers, and judges to
understand that the beacon of antitrust and competition law is not just
maximizing consumer welfare and economic efficiency, but achieving that
goal by confining enforcement to preventing bullying and ganging up that
seriously threatens competition. When decision-makers train the weapons
of the antitrust arsenal on other practices, they run the risk of both reaching
the wrong results and losing public support. When their aim is true,
everyone is better off.
Innate as they are, anticompetitive bullying and ganging up are not
about to disappear any time soon, as demonstrated year after year by the
single-firm misconduct that continues to surface and the cartels that
continue to be exposed. The challenge is to foster a competitive economy
in the face of our baser instincts through intelligent application of the law.
Antitrust is not that complicated. Once this is appreciated, both the
direction and the value of antitrust become easier to comprehend, apply,
and explain: Don’t put up with bullies who stifle competition. Don’t
permit ganging up to diminish competition. Then, let competition sort out
the winners and losers, and may the best competitors win.

